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Abstract Cross-country comparisons avoid the unsteady equilibrium in which
regulators have to balance between economies of scale and a sufficient number of
remaining comparable utilities. By the use of data envelopment analysis, we compare
the efficiency of the drinking water sector in the Netherlands, England and Wales,
Australia, Portugal and Belgium. After introducing a procedure to measure the homo-
geneity of an industry, robust order-m partial frontiers are used to detect outlying
observations. By applying bootstrapping algorithms, bias-corrected first and second
stage results are estimated. Our results suggest that incentive regulation in the sense
of regulatory and benchmark incentive schemes have a significant positive effect on
efficiency. By suitably adapting the conditional efficiency measures of Daraio and
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New York 2007) to the bias corrected estimates of Simar and Wilson (Manage Sci,
44(1): 49–61, 1998), we incorporate environmental variables directly into the effi-
ciency estimates. We firstly equalize the social, physical and institutional environment,
and secondly, deduce the effect of incentive schemes on utilities as they would work
under similar conditions. The analysis demonstrates that in absence of clear and struc-
tural incentives the average efficiency of the utilities falls in comparison with utilities
which are encouraged by incentives.
Keywords Data envelopment analysis · Bootstrapping · Incentive scheme ·
Water industry · Efficiency measurement
JEL Classification C14 · L51 · L95 · C61
1 Introduction
The merits of competition are abundantly demonstrated in economic theory.
However, a monopolistic configuration may be desirable in certain activities. Par-
ticularly operations with large sunk costs or increasing returns to scale could lead to
a natural monopoly. Irrespective of ownership, whether private or public owned utili-
ties, every natural monopoly involves welfare cost to society by creating the quiet life
of Hicks (1935), the X-inefficiency of Leibenstein (1966) or making excess profits.
The problem is similar to a principal-agent problem under asymmetric information.
The monopolistic utilities (the agents) have private information about their ability to
transform inputs into outputs. As society (the principal) wants a guaranteed service at
the lowest price possible, the utilities can extract information rents. The objective of
society is to minimize the extraction of information rents while assuring a satisfactory
service. Policy makers can apply a broad range of incentive schemes in order to reach
this goal. The different institutional frameworks (e.g., divestiture, concession or yard-
stick competition) reflect the different regulatory and ideological views among socie-
ties. Especially within local public utilities, ideological views could prevail, mainly if
the water services are deemed services of general interest and not services of general
economic interest and, therefore, should not be subject to competition law.
In this article, we examine the role of incentive schemes in the drinking water
sector. We investigate whether regulatory and benchmark incentive schemes amelio-
rate the efficiency of utilities which are encouraged by incentives. To make abstraction
of ideological conflicts, we are considering efficiency. Indeed, whatever the ideolog-
ical background, no one can accept inefficiencies which are, basically, resources left
over on the table. This article compares the incentive schemes of five different coun-
tries: benchmarking the drinking water sector as in the Netherlands, privatization as
in England and Wales, a strong regulatory framework as in Australia, municipal pro-
vision with private sector participation as in Portugal or different levels of public
management as in Belgium. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper apply-
ing international benchmarking (i.e. a comparison of different countries) in the water
sector to the developed countries and trying to determine the most effective incentive
scheme towards efficiency maximization.
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In methodological terms, this paper follows the literature on data envelopment
analysis (DEA). This nonparametric technique is particularly useful in the efficiency
measurement of public utilities where knowledge of the production function is rela-
tively scarce. However, the first DEA models suffer from some serious inconveniences
which are dealt with in this article. Firstly, the models, as developed by Charnes et al.
(1978) and Banker et al. (1984), did not allow for statistical inference. Only recently,
by the work of Simar and Wilson (1998), was statistical inference introduced. We
apply their methodology, which is based on bootstrapping, to determine the bias-cor-
rected first and second stage results (i.e., with and without considering the exogenous
environment). Secondly, the deterministic frontier models are sensitive to outlying
and atypical observations. Following Simar (2003), we apply the robust order-m effi-
ciencies of Cazals et al. (2002) to detect the outlying observations in the sample.
These results are compared with the more traditional outlier detection procedures of
peer count (Charnes et al. 1985), super-efficiency (Andersen and Petersen 1993), peer
index (Torgersen et al. 1996) and the Wilson method (1993). Thirdly, when compar-
ing efficiency of entities in data sets with a heterogeneous size, Zhang and Bartels
(1998) point out that the average efficiencies can not simply be compared. There-
fore, we develop an approach based on the bandwidth of the Kernel estimates and
employ the approach to stipulate the homogeneity of a country’s drinking water sec-
tor. Finally, almost all two stage procedures suffer from the separability condition in
that the exogenous environmental variables do not directly influence the estimated
efficiency scores. Only recently, by the conditional efficiency estimates of Daraio and
Simar (2005, 2007), has this issue been tackled. We suitably adapt the conditional
efficiency analysis to the bias correction framework of Simar and Wilson (1998) in
order to obtain the conditional bias corrected efficiency estimates. The latter reflect
bias corrected efficiencies for utilities which could be considered as working in exactly
the same exogenous environment (i.e., they immediately incorporate the exogenous
environment).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional frameworks
in the Dutch, English and Welsh, Australian, Portuguese and Belgian drinking water
sector. Section 3 briefly reviews the methodology and literature on the use of DEA
in water services. In Sect. 4, we specify the DEA model and determine the homo-
geneity in efficiency in the national drinking water sectors. Section 5 starts with an
introduction on the bootstrap methodology as outlined by Simar and Wilson (2000)
and continues with describing the first stage results. Section 6 determines by the use
of censored and truncated Tobit regressions and by a bootstrapping algorithm the
influential environmental variables. In addition, it develops and applies the condi-
tional bias corrected efficiency estimates. Finally, Sect. 7 provides some concluding
remarks.
2 The institutional framework in the water sector
Many approaches have been suggested to solve the principle-agent problem (see, e.g.,
Laffont and Tirole 1993). Although every government wants a secure drinking water
provision at a price as low as possible, countries have different ideological views on the
123
192 K. De Witte, R. C. Marques
extent of state intervention in the economy which creates different incentive schemes.
In this section, we compare the incentive schemes implemented in the Netherlands,
England and Wales, Australia, Portugal and Belgium.
For the ease of understanding, we first define the concepts of benchmarking,
yardstick competition and sunshine regulation. Benchmarking denotes the process of
comparing the current performance of a utility with a reference performance. There-
fore, it is only a tool to improve performances and not a regulatory method per se. The
regulatory methods include the consequences and the effects of the use of benchmark-
ing, e.g., employed in yardstick competition. In the water sector, the two existing types
of yardstick competition (also referred to as competition by comparison) are ‘price
yardstick competition’ and ‘sunshine regulation’ (Marques 2006). The former intends
to define the tariffs and mainly consists of price cap or revenue cap regulation where
the factor X in their formulas are determined by benchmarking techniques. Sunshine
regulation intends to ‘embarrass’ the utilities that reveal an inferior performance by a
public discussion of the efficiency scores. Even if sunshine regulation is not triggered
compulsorily (e.g., by a sector-specific regulator), the public display of efficiency lev-
els provides transparency in the sector and generates a competitive pressure which
prevents the quiet life of Hicks (1935) and the X -inefficiency of Leibenstein (1966).
In the remaining of this paper, we identify sunshine regulation with benchmarking and
a regulatory process with yardstick competition.
2.1 The Netherlands
In the late 1990s, the Netherlands were engaged in a debate on the privatization of
water services. The issue was driven by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs,
which published in 1997 a study on prospects for utilizing market forces in the drink-
ing water sector (Dijkgraaf et al. 1997). It concluded that privatization might reduce
the price of water services by, at least, 10 percent. The water sector (i.e., the drinking
water companies and the waterboards which are responsible for sewage treatment)
was strongly opposed to the privatization idea. Therefore, the Dutch water compa-
nies tried to escape government regulation by using self-regulation and, in particular,
by a voluntary benchmark organized by the Association of Dutch Drinking Water
Companies (Vereniging voor Waterbedrijven in Nederland, VEWIN) in 1999, 2004
and 2007. The results are remarkable as in a sector with only very low technological
change, the efficiency gains over the period 1997–2006 reached 23%. In addition,
thanks to the increased transparency and efficiency by the voluntary benchmark, the
Dutch government decided, in 2003, to protect the drinking water sector as a public
domain. Nowadays, water services are provided by government owned Public Limited
Companies (PLCs). However, through a series of mergers, stimulated by the provin-
cial governments, many PLCs have grown to a size where they supply a substantial
part of a province or more. The scale increase was initially instigated and enforced
by the provinces, as they consider 100.000 connections as the minimal size for the
companies to guarantee the best services and quality at the lowest price. In the 1960s,
the Netherlands counted about 200 water supply companies while in 1980 the number
was reduced to about 100. There was a further reduction to 60 utilities in 1990. In
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2000 there were only 20 PLCs left for about 16 million inhabitants (Kuks 2001). The
number further declined to 13 drinking water companies at the end of 2006. How-
ever, recent research for the Dutch drinking water sector indicates that the efficiency
gains can not be attributed to merger economies, the more so because the incentive
mechanisms (De Witte and Dijkgraaf 2007).
2.2 England and Wales
As early as in 1984, the Thatcher Government advanced plans to privatize the drinking
water sector in England and Wales. After a public outcry, the plans were suspended
until the reelection in 1987. By the Water Act of 1989, the ten regional water authorities
which were responsible for water quality, supply and sewerage, since the nationaliza-
tion of the water industry in 1974, were privatized and floated on the London Stock
Exchange. The Water Act gave the newly established PLCs a 25 year concession for
sewerage and water supply. The existing 29 private water companies were also licensed
and continued to operate in their respective area (Lobina and Hall 2001).
Privatization entails a change in ownership, financing and regulatory structure of the
industry. Three regulatory agencies were created: an environmental regulator (Envi-
ronment Agency), a drinking water quality regulator (Drinking Water Inspectorate)
and an economic regulator (the Office of Water Services, OFWAT). For our purpose,
only OFWAT is of relevance. OFWAT uses a price-cap regulation which limits the
annual growth rate of the water price for every water company by a factor K. The
variable K is calculated as the growth rate of the Retail Prices Index (RPI) minus
a productivity factor X which is determined by comparing the performances of the
water utilities (i.e., by benchmarking). The price cap regulation creates an incentive
to increase efficiency and innovation as this will reduce expenditures in addition to
the revenue allowed by the price-cap.
2.3 Australia
The regulatory framework of the Australian water sector has several appealing
characteristics. The Australian governments, both at state and federal levels, were
able to take advantage of the strengths and weaknesses of the UK and USA older reg-
ulatory models. Thanks to the regulatory procedures close to the American ideas of
transparency, enactment and accountability and to the typical UK performance incen-
tives through benchmarking and yardstick competition, a unique incentive scheme
based on strict regulation arose. Note that Australia has been the pioneer of bench-
marking in the water industry, as even prior to the first American and English studies,
Australia developed already research documents about benchmarking. Since 1994,
the Australian Government Council, in the scope of the National Competition Policy,
has decided to reform the water industry and defined a clear policy and strategy for
this sector to fulfil in 10 years (until 2005). Among other measures, the reforms in
this sector aimed at its corporatization and sustainability, defining, for example, the
legality of the user/payer principle and the total costs recovery (National Competition
Policy 1998).
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2.4 Portugal
In Portugal, except for Lisbon, the water service responsibility belonged until the 1990s
exclusively to the municipalities. Private sector participation has only been allowed
since 1993. In addition, the reform created the ‘multimunicipal systems’ which pro-
vide ‘bulk’ water to at least two municipalities and require a predominant investment
by the State for reasons of national interest. The remaining organizational forms are
called ‘municipal systems’, even though they could be managed by an association
of municipalities. The regulatory reform includes the possibility of direct operation
and management of the multimunicipal systems by the State, the municipalities or
their associations. It allows for concessions of the municipal systems management
and operation to companies, irrespective of capital shareholder, or to users associa-
tions. In 1998, the establishment of municipal companies was regulated according to
three frameworks, corresponding to only one municipality, more than one municipality
(intermunicipal company) and to one or more municipalities with a private partner with
minor shareholding (mixed company). The latter is subject to a public tender. A state
public company, Empresa Portuguesa de Águas Livres (EPAL), is responsible for the
water service of Lisbon, but it embodies an atypical situation in Portugal.
2.5 Belgium
Although Belgium is a federal country and the drinking water supply has been
a regional policy since 1980 (i.e., a responsibility of the Flemish and the Walloon gov-
ernment), price regulation remains a federal issue. Within the drinking water sector, the
decisions by the pricing commission are considered as rather ad hoc and only based on
the current costs. By law, drinking water supply is the responsibility of the municipali-
ties although four different organizational structures can be distinguished. Firstly, both
in the Flemish and the Walloon region, municipalities have organized themselves into
‘intercommunales’. Intercommunales are a typical Belgian structure which gives the
organized municipalities corporate personality. Secondly, if the municipalities refrain
from supplying drinking water to their inhabitants, the regional drinking water com-
pany (former national) provides water to this area. This regional company is called the
‘Vlaamse Maatschappij voor Watervoorziening’ (VMW) in the Flemish region and
the ‘Société Wallonne De Eaux’ (SWDE) in the Walloon region. A third and fourth
organizational structure are municipal water suppliers and municipal services. These
utilities, respectively, do have and do not have technical and financial autonomy. There
are no structural incentives in the sector (De Witte 2006).
3 International benchmarking by DEA
In this study, we will ‘benchmark’ the Dutch, English and Welsh, Australian,
Portuguese and Belgian drinking water utilities against each other. To obtain a com-
parison of the current performance against a reference performance (and hence
to benchmark), we assume a common frontier technology, allowing utilities from
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different countries to support the envelope. Alternatively, we can establish a national
frontier production function in which only a country’s own firms may be best practices.
Since a whole range of methodologies exist to determine performance scores based on
production estimates, it is important to identify the strengths and limitations of these
techniques (for a survey, see Berg 2006). We use DEA to estimate the production
frontier. We first focus on some advantages of cross-country comparisons.
3.1 Cross-country comparisons
Regulators balance between economies of scale (i.e., mergers in the drinking water
sector) and a sufficient number of remaining comparable companies. In this respect,
cross-country comparisons offer some advantages. Firstly, studies which compare the
efficiency of drinking water companies in different countries offer the possibility to
escape the unsteady equilibrium between economies of scale and the number of com-
parators. Secondly, one can use a larger database to benchmark the national best prac-
tices. The possibility that a national best practice remains the reference in an enlarged
data set decreases, which provides additional incentives to the best performing firms
of a country. A third advantage arises from the potentially closer approximation to the
world best-practice frontier (Estache et al. 2004). In this article, we develop a fourth
advantage of cross-country comparisons as we would like to examine objectively the
effectiveness of incentive schemes. Therefore, in an international data set, we mea-
sure the efficiency of the water utilities by the use of DEA. After correcting bias in
the efficiency estimates and after taking into account environmental factors, which
are out of control of the firm’s management, we evaluate the effect on efficiency of
a benchmarking and regulation incentive scheme.
However, international benchmarking raises some particular difficulties. The most
intricate issue is the lack of comparability of the data as national regulators define
concepts slightly differently. Even in national benchmark studies, interpretation of
definitions and measurement of variables could differ. Secondly, exchange rate fluc-
tuations are important when comparing monetary units. Thirdly, the unequal extent
of outsourcing in the different countries influences the total number of employees
(and the staff cost). Fourthly, some country specific differences are beyond the control
of the firms’ managers. Dissimilarities such as wage rates, taxes or rates of return
on capital could induce different policy options (Jamasb and Pollitt 2001). Finally,
heterogeneity creates differences between countries which could be falsely taken as
inefficiencies.
In this article, we try to take into account these concerns by focusing on four specific
assumptions. Firstly, we adopt variables in quantities (e.g., the inputs staff and mains
length) that are less susceptible to the lack of comparability. Secondly, the major differ-
ences among countries are related to taxation issues. However, thanks to the quantities
variables, tax heterogeneity does not significantly influence the model. Indeed, higher
water prices should reduce the consumption, although this is not empirically observed.
Nevertheless, in second stage analysis, we include variables for water consumption
per capita and relative wealth of consumers. Thirdly, also other heterogeneous fac-
tors which characterize the operational and institutional environment are integrated in
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the second stage analysis of the model. Fourthly, an important aspect not completely
integrated in this article is the level of outsourcing. Although these data are not avail-
able, we contacted the professional associations of the water sector which confirmed
that the degree of outsourcing is more or less the same among the countries in the
analysis. Notice for example that, in our sample, the Australian water services, which
may seem very different from the others, correspond only to major cities of Australia,
and thus, are more comparable to the other observations. Fifthly, we identify the out-
liers by several methods, so that atypical observations are eliminated from the sample
and homogeneity of the data set increases.
3.2 Determining efficiency
From 1985 until the beginning of 2006, around 40 DEA applications to the water
services were carried out.1 The case-studies which were made public amount to 30.
The most frequently cited studies are referred to in Table 1 and will be briefly described
next. The objectives of these studies are diverse, although most of them focus on the
water services (WS) performance measurement with regulatory aims. The protago-
nists are generally academic or regulatory authorities. The models entail 13 countries,
namely the USA, Australia, UK, Denmark, Norway, Japan, Italy, Mexico, Portugal,
Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Brazil. Out of these case-studies, 12 comprise
both the water supply, the sewerage and the sewage treatment; 12 comprise only the
water supply; 3 the sewerage and 3 the sewage treatment separately. The 30 studies
mentioned correspond to 38 distinct models. These are mostly input-oriented. Only
two studies concern non-oriented models. Without including the units, the studies
comprise 23 inputs, 22 outputs and 20 different explanatory factors. The most fre-
quently adopted inputs are the staff, the operational expenditures (OPEX), the energy
and the mains length. The leading outputs are the distributed (revenue) water volume,
the number of customers and the network length, while the main explanatory factors
are the water source (or the associated treatment), the water volume distributed by
type of customer and the density of inhabitants (or customers). Table 2 systematizes
the inputs, outputs and explanatory factors which are used more than three times by
at least more than one article.
At last, it should be highlighted that different organizations have fostered and tried
to apply international benchmarking by sharing a lot of data. The World Bank, by
means of its International Benchmarking Network (IBNET ), and the ADERASA
(Asociación de Entes Reguladores de Agua Potable y Saneamiento de las Américas)
correspond to good examples. Although this circumstance is more frequently associ-
ated with developing countries, it also occurs in developed countries, such as England
and Wales (E & W) through the publications of OFWAT (Office of Water Services)
on international comparisons.
1 A recent overview study of González-Gómez and García-Rubio (2008) also provides an excellent picture
of the number of studies about efficiency in the water sector and of their main features during the last four
decades.
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Table 1 Main DEA studies
Study Object Focus Results
Byrnes (1986) 143 WS from the
USA
Ownership Results depend on
the model





Norman and Stoker (1991) 25 WS from E&W Market structure Efficiency as the
most important
aspect




ACT (1995) Australia; E&W ACTEW performance Significant
inefficiency
level
London Economics (1995) 30 WS E&W; 6
Australia





Bosworth et al. (1996) 10 WS from E&W WS Regulation Significant
inefficiency
level




Wood et al. (1997) WS from E&W WS performance Significant
inefficiency
level
Aida et al. (1998) 108 WS from Japan Market structure Smaller size, more
efficient
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Table 1 continued
Study Object Focus Results
Liang (2003) 11 WS from Australia WS performance Significant
average
inefficiency
Marques and Monteiro (2003) 45 Portuguese WS WS performance Private more
productive





Tupper and Resende (2004) 20 Brazilian state WS WS Regulation Significant cost
savings and YC
potential
Marques and Monteiro (2005) 70 Portuguese WS WS performance High efficiency
earnings
potential






than those of the
West Bank
Table 2 Inputs, outputs and
explanatory factors adopted in
the bibliographic references




Customers number 1 17
Mains length 15 10
Water source/treatment 1 2 14
Staff 16 2
Energy 11 1
Distributed water volume 28
Volume by customer class 3 12
Reagents costs 4
Miscellaneous costs 5
Other OPEX (without staff) 6
Customers/population density 8
Revenues 4
Peak factor 2 6
Water losses 4 2 5
3.3 Data envelopment analysis model
The DEA approach constructs the above mentioned nonparametric frontier as the
piecewise linear combination of all efficient Decision Making Units (DMUs) in
a sample. The generic DEA model was proposed by Charnes et al. (1978). As their
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model assumed constant returns to scale (CRS), Banker et al. (1984) extended this
to variable returns to scale (VRS). The extension involves the introduction of a
convexity constraint ensuring that DMUs are only compared with ‘similar’ DMUs
(e.g., similar size). The essential characteristic of the CCR-model is the reduction of a
multiple-output/multiple-input situation for each DMU, to that of a virtual-output/vir-
tual-input. The technical efficiency measure is calculated as this ratio of weighted
outputs to weighted inputs.
Assume there are n DMUs to be evaluated, each consuming a varying amount of
m different inputs, to produce s different outputs. In particular, DMU j consumes an
amount x ji of input i and produces y jr of output r . We label the evaluated observation
by the subscript ‘o’. The DEA-CRS model with input-orientation, which searches for











j=1 ν j x ji
≤ 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
μr > 0, ν j > 0, for all r, j.
To obtain the technical efficiency score θ for each of the n DMUs, the linear program-
ming problem needs to be repeated n times. The set of normalizing constraints (one
for each DMU) reflects the condition that the virtual output to the virtual input ratio of
every DMU is less than or equal to unity. DMUo is efficient if and only if its efficiency
score θ = 1 while an inefficient DMU is denoted by θ < 1.
Remark that, if the number of DMUs in the sample increases from n to n + p,
the only change in the model is the addition of p normalization constraints. Due to
the implying reduction of the feasible solution set, the new optimal solution for any
existing DMU must be less or equal to the previous optimal solution. Therefore, by
construction, joining separate data sets does not increase the efficiency scores of the
individual DMUs in comparison with the separate analysis. This is an important aspect
in international benchmark studies as the combination of national databases increases
the number of observations.
4 Data and indicators
Choosing the input and output variables is the most important stage in any DEA
assessment as the results are highly influenced by this choice (Sect. 4.1). Kittelsen
(1993) proposes a statistical procedure to analyze the selection of the variables, which
we apply to the choice of the orientation (i.e., input versus output) and the option of
returns to scale (i.e., constant versus variable) (Sect. 4.2). Section 4.3 compares the
homogeneity in efficiency among the countries in the data set. We partly tackle the
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The Netherlands 13 379 8,867 87,538,462 565,462 1,490
England-Wales 23 1,306 14,540 242,703,893 913,975 699
Australia 17 464 5,450 118,735,000 340,330 862
Portugal-public 29 193 778 9,719,033 70,551 366
Portugal-private 15 91 590 4,948,958 35,793 391
Belgiuma 25 226 3,550 23,924,449 136,592 604
a 2004 data
intricate comparability of data by considering only non-monetary variables which are
less affected by purchasing power and exchange rates. However, as definitions could
still slightly differ between countries, we carefully examine the results and test them
on outliers (Sect. 4.4). In international comparisons, it is appealing to estimate the
technical efficiency of companies as the goal of maximizing technical efficiency is
not in conflict with any other goals. Indeed, inefficiencies are, basically, resources left
over on the table.
4.1 The data
The data are obtained from various sector organizations. One has to be very careful
by the slight differences in definitions. As we are not competent to make these speci-
fications uniform, we simply use the data from the national databases. The Dutch data
are deduced from the ‘Benchmark’ studies and the annual ‘Water Supply Statistics’
organized by VEWIN. The latest year available is 2005. The English and Welsh data
are obtained from the ‘June Return’ by OFWAT which collects information from each
of the water companies. Most data tables contain information from the 1997–2005
period. The Australian data are obtained by means of ‘Water Services Association
of Australia facts’, published annually (since 1966) by the Water Services Australian
Association that compiles and audits the data. The data of the Portuguese water ser-
vices are collected directly by the annual accounts and activity reports produced by
the utilities. As some technical data were sometimes missing in the reports, the com-
panies were contacted in order to provide them. Data on the Belgian water industry
are compiled by Belgaqua, the Belgian umbrella organization, since 1993. In contrast
to other countries, the most recent year available is 2004.
Descriptive statistics for the various countries are presented in Table 3. The dif-
ference in utility size is large, as revealed by the averages in the different columns.
An average English and Welsh water company counts 14 times more employees than
a private Portuguese firm. Also productivity, measured by the number of connections
per employee, differs significantly. A Dutch employee handles 4 times more connec-
tions than his Portuguese colleague.
123
An international benchmark study in the water sector 201
4.2 Model specification
DEA models should, as much as possible, reflect the consumed resources and the
produced outputs. The inputs of our DEA model consist of labor and capital. We
proxy labor input by the number of employees (in full time equivalents). Measur-
ing labor in a single aggregate variable implicitly assumes a uniform skill distribution
across firms. Ideally, we should make a distinction between three categories: unskilled
labor, skilled labor and management (Estache et al. 2004). However, this disaggre-
gation seems not to be available. By including per capita Gross Regional Product
(GRP) in the second stage (see infra), we try to control for the differences in skill
distributions. The length of mains (in kilometers) is used as a proxy for capital inputs.
We prefer the length of mains to the capital expenditures as it is easier to measure
and less prone to inaccuracies from variations in estimating current construction and
exchange rates. The outputs in the model reflect the main activities from the drinking
water companies, i.e., the companies have to deliver water to their customers. We use
the volume of delivered water as a first output indicator (in m3), while the number of
connections is applied as the second output variable.
The relative nature of DEA makes it, as in every empirically oriented methodol-
ogy, vulnerable to problems with the degrees of freedom. The number of degrees of
freedom will increase with the number of DMUs in the data set, and decrease with
the number of input and output variables. Banker et al. (1989) suggest a rough rule
of thumb. Let m be the number of inputs and s be the number of outputs used in the
analysis, then the sample size n should satisfy n ≥ max{m × s, 3(m + s)}. This rule
of thumb is satisfied in our analysis.
We use the procedure of Kittelsen (1993) to decide on the orientation of the DEA
model. Kittelsen tests whether a change in model specification significantly changes
the results. If we denote the efficiency of company i measured by an input and output-
oriented DEA model by, respectively, E0i and E
1
i , the hypothesis can be formulated as:
H0 : E0i = E1i H1 : E0i < E1i . (2)
Several statistics are proposed to test these hypotheses. We compare the mean
efficiencies by the ordinary paired t-test (in particular, two sided for the input-output
test, while one sided for the CRS-VRS test), while the median efficiencies are com-
pared by the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The efficiency scores are com-
puted by the use of the statistical program R and its package ‘FEAR’ developed by
Wilson (2005). The test results are presented in Table 4. Firstly, the input-oriented
model does significantly differ from the output-oriented model, so that a choice has
to be made. As water utilities are obliged to supply all customers and as they cannot
encourage the consumption (i.e., demand side management policy), the input-oriented
approach is preferred. In the remaining of this paper, we will only compute the input-
oriented DEA-scores. Secondly, to determine the returns to scale, let E0i and E
1
i denote,
respectively, the efficiency of company i in an input-oriented DEA-model with con-
stant and variable returns to scale. The test results in Table 5 show that the CRS-model
significantly differs from the VRS-model, so that a choice with respect to returns to
scale has also to be made. We apply the VRS model as this assumption is less strin-
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Table 4 Kittelsen
test—orientation Variable Mean Median Std. dev. mean
Input-oriented-E0 0.6324 0.5786 0.2389
Output-oriented-E1 0.6162 0.5733 0.2551
Method d f Value Probability
t-Test 121 2.4340 0.017
Wilcoxon signed-rank 2.8620 0.014
Table 5 Kittelsen test—returns
to scale Variable Mean Median Std. dev. mean
CRS-E0 0.5464 0.4989 0.2351
VRS-E1 0.6324 0.5786 0.2389
Method d f Value Probability
t-Test 121 6.3090 0.0000
Wilcoxon signed rank 6.3150 0.0000
Table 6 The applied input and
output variables Input Output
Number of employees (in fte) Water delivery
Lengh of mains (in km) Number of connections
gent and ensures that DMUs are only compared with ‘similar’ DMUs. In addition,
the water utilities cannot change its size in the short-term. Table 6 presents the model
specification (the applied input and output variables).
4.3 Homogeneity in efficiency
By restricting the data set to companies of the same country, we obtain a ‘national
efficiency comparison’. In this case, every DMU is compared with companies of its
own nationality. Hence, as in De Witte (2006), we interpret the average ‘national’ effi-
ciency as a measure for the homogeneity in efficiency of a country’s drinking water
sector. Indeed, by construction, DEA detects the relatively most efficient firms which
determine the efficiency of the relatively less efficient firms. If all companies in the
data set are rather similar (i.e., homogeneous), the individual DEA efficiency scores
will be higher. This results in a higher average efficiency of the country (see Table 7).
Zhang and Bartels (1998) argue that the average efficiencies cannot simply be
compared. On average, the technical efficiency score of a DMU will decrease as the
sample size increases. To equalize the size of the data sets, we resample the effi-
ciency scores by a procedure which comprises three steps. Firstly, for every country,
we compute the input-oriented DEA-VRS efficiency scores as described in Sect. 4.2.
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Table 7 Homogeneity
in efficiency Bandwidth Average efficiency
The Netherlands 0.1813 0.8330






Secondly, by the use of the code ‘FEAR’ (Wilson 2005), we determine the optimal
bandwidth for a nonparametric Kernel function of the efficiency estimates. Following
Simar and Wilson (2008), we use the unbiased cross-validation criterion which min-
imizes the estimate of the mean-integrated square error. Although the Kernel density
estimate also depends on the size of the data set, the sample size issue is only of
minor importance (cf., the empirical rule approximating the cross-validation principle
equals h = 1.06 min(s2m, r2m/1.34)(2m)−1/5 where 2m denotes the reflected data,
s2m the standard deviation of 2m and r2m the interquartile range). The bandwidth of
every country is presented in Table 7. Finally, we resample the original DEA-VRS
efficiency scores to obtain s values drawn from a Kernel estimate of the bounded den-
sity of the efficiency estimates (i.e., the estimates are bounded above at one). We set
s equal to 44, the size of the largest data set. The average resampled efficiencies (and
thus the average of the 44 observations) are presented in the third column of Table 7.
Remark that the sample size bias could have been avoided by the use of the robust
order-m efficiency scores of Cazals et al. (2002) as well (for a simulated example, see
De Witte and Marques 2009).
It turns out that the efficiency in the Belgian drinking water sector is the most
homogeneous, closely followed by the Netherlands. In those two countries, it should
be relatively easy for policy makers to adopt new laws which are generally approved
by all water utilities. Portugal ends as the most heterogeneous country in efficiency.
Nevertheless, the high heterogeneity can especially be attributed to the public sector.
The efficiency of private Portuguese drinking water companies seems to be very sim-
ilar to each other.
4.4 Outlier detection
Influential data affect the efficiency results of a significant number of other DMUs.
In other words, part of the efficient DMUs are the peers of other DMUs, while the
remaining efficient DMUs are just peers of themselves or of a reduced number of
DMUs. Actually, the identification of influential efficient DMUs becomes fundamen-
tal in DEA analysis, specially if they can be considered outliers, and for that reason
can be taken out of the sample, or if they are regarded as ‘true’ benchmarks and, there-
fore, essential to the benchmarking analysis. The opposite case of outliers presence,
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but with inefficient DMUs, has little effect in the analysis, except with regard to that
DMU itself. We will neglect this case here.
4.4.1 Theoretical background
A major drawback of DEA lies in its deterministic nature, in that the frontier model
assumes
Prob((x, y)) = 1 (3)
where  denotes the attainable set ( ={(x, y)R+|x can produce y}). DMUs
located in the interior of  operate technically inefficient, while firms on the bound-
ary of  are technically efficient. Equation (3) states that deterministic models do not
allow for outliers. Outlying observations could arise from measurement errors, noise
and influential observations (e.g., atypical data) or observations with favorable values
on a specific variable. Although our data are obtained from national regulators and
sector organizations, measurement errors could arise from the different definitions
operated. Therefore, outlier detection procedures are employed in this and the next
section. Due to the specific characteristics of each outlier procedure, several techniques
to identify outliers have to be evaluated (De Witte and Marques 2007).
Firstly, a simple outlier determination procedure is the computation of the ‘peer
count index’ (Charnes et al. 1985). This involves the computation of the number of
times an efficient DMU is peer of an inefficient DMU. Both higher and lower values
point to the presence of outliers.
Secondly, Andersen and Petersen (1993) compute the super-efficiencies which cal-
culate to what extent the efficient DMUs can increase their inputs by keeping them-
selves technically efficient (input-oriented), or vice-versa, reduce their outputs and
at the same time continue to be efficient (output-oriented). In numerical terms, the
procedure consists in taking out the efficient DMUs themselves at the moment of their
evaluation, so that the efficiency can be higher than 1. Observations with high values
are suspected to be outliers.
Thirdly, in spite of sorting the efficient DMUs with regard to the efficiency surpluses,
super-efficiency does not say anything about their sorting according to the importance
of the efficient DMUs as reference or benchmarking element for the inefficient DMUs
of the sample. A hypothesis of measuring the suitability of the efficient DMU to be
best practice consists of computing the indicator ρ, called the peer index, of the effi-






x Pki − xki
)
x Pk − xk
(4)
where λi j denotes the weight of the efficient DMU j for the inefficient DMUi , xki
the input k of DMUi and x Pki represents the target (score at the frontier) for the input
k of DMUi . The measure ρkk expresses the percentage of the potential reduction of
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an input k that is represented by the inefficient DMUs which depend on the efficient
DMU j . The higher the ρkk , the larger the possibilities of employing that DMU for
benchmarking or in other perspective the larger the possibility that it is an outlier.
Fourthly, Wilson (1993) uses in his descriptive model the relative change due to
the deletion of i observations from the sample. As a multi-output extension of the
geometric influence function R(i)L (XY ) of Andrews and Pregidon (1978), the graphi-
cal analysis of log ratios (log(R(i)L (XY )/R(i)min)) examines the separation between the
smallest ratios. This ratio is computed for each of the possible subsets L of size i .
The choice of i , the stopping point of the analysis, is arbitrary but involves a dramati-
cally increasing computational burden (as there are (ni
)
combinations). Nevertheless,
to avoid a ‘masking effect’ by which one outlier could be hidden behind another with
similar values, i should be large enough.
Finally, Simar (2003) uses the robust order-m efficiencies of Cazals et al. (2002).
Instead of using all the observations to determine the efficient frontier (i.e., a full fron-
tier), the order-m partial frontier uses a sample of size m which is drawn from the total
sample with size n. Whereas a full frontier indicates for all firms which produce at least
level y of outputs the minimum achievable lower boundary of inputs, the expected
frontier function of order-m is the expected minimal input achieved by any m firms
drawn from the population of firms which produce at least y outputs. With an order-m
input oriented frontier, an observation which lies far above the frontier (i.e., a value
considerably larger than 1) will be determined as an outlier.
4.4.2 Detecting outliers
The results of the peer index, super-efficiency, peer count and Wilson are presented in
Table 8, while order-m efficiencies are shown in Table 9. The former four methods can
be considered as the most traditional outlier detection procedures. There seems to be
a high consensus among the three methods, although concerning the super-efficiency
(SE) we can only label Dwr Cymry, Lisboa and Thames for sure as suspected out-
liers (the other observations have a lower super-efficiency value). The three meth-
ods identify the same 5 Belgian, 4 Dutch, 3 Australian, 1 English, 1 Welsh and 1
Portuguese firms as possible outliers. These outlying observations differ from the
Wilson (1993) analysis in which we equalized i to 12. As the separation is relatively
large for i = 1, 5 and 8, we regard the corresponding observations as outliers (details
are available upon request). As the order-m results are influenced by the value of m, we
compute the order-m efficiency score for different values of m. Following the example
by Simar (2003), we use 200 Monte-Carlo replications in computing the estimates. As
it is difficult to decide on an appropriate value from which on an observation should
be determined as an outlier (i.e., what is considerably larger than one?), we consider
the 15 most outlying observations as outliers. On average, there are six DMUs which
are stipulated as outliers by all four methods.
As the results of the peer index, sensitivity analysis and peer count index are closely
related, we consider these procedures as more robust. In the remaining of this article,
from the sample of 122 observations we eliminate the 15 outlying DMUs as determined
by the more traditional procedures, so that we obtain a data set of 107 observations.
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Table 8 Outlier detection: traditional methods and Wilson (1993)
Peer count index Super-efficiency Peer index Employees Mains Wilson
Brisbane 1 Brisbane 1.033 Brisbane 0.011 0.009 Anglian
Calamine 46 Calamine 1.025 Calamine 0.090 0.070 Dwr Cymru
Chimay 9 Chimay 1.210 Chimay 0.020 0.014 Severn Trent
City west 44 City west 1.243 City west 0.068 0.070 South west
Dwr Cymry 24 Dwr Cymry 8.296 Dwr Cymry 0.040 0.075 SWDE
DZH 20 DZH 1.114 DZH 0.103 0.132 Thames
Evides 16 Evides 1.057 Evides 0.143 0.184 V.M.W.
Hulpe 10 Hulpe 1.200 Hulpe 0.005 0.009 Vitens
IWVA 29 IWVA 1.749 IWVA 0.077 0.026
Lisboa 35 Lisboa 3.720 Lisboa 0.074 0.042
Thames 14 Thames Infeasible Thames 0.128 0.161
TWM 52 TWM 1.094 TWM 0.063 0.080
Waimes 4 Waimes 1.250 Waimes 0.000 0.001
WLB 53 WLB 1.203 WLB 0.114 0.071
Yarra 12 Yarra 1.052 Yarra 0.065 0.056
Table 9 Outlier detection: Simar (2003)
m = 10 SE m = 40 SE m = 60 SE m = 80 SE
Dwr Cymry 19.57 12.27 Dwr Cymry 7.722 7.63 Dwr Cymry 4.660 5.90 Dwr Cymry 3.681 5.24
Lisboa 10.06 6.35 Lisboa 4.560 3.12 Lisboa 3.415 2.92 Lisboa 2.748 2.63
Thames 6.505 6.06 Thames 2.767 1.64 City west 2.270 1.70 City west 1.979 1.59
City west 5.710 3.45 City west 2.623 1.85 WLB 1.984 1.07 Thames 1.693 0.78
Coliban 5.461 3.33 WLB 2.256 1.18 Thames 1.875 1.04 A.W.W. 1.686 0.84
South east 4.455 3.71 A.W.W. 2.123 1.00 A.W.W. 1.812 0.90 WLB 1.648 0.95
Yarra 4.391 3.54 Brisbane 2.079 0.91 Gold coast 1.725 0.87 Gold coast 1.566 0.81
Brisbane 4.332 3.06 Gippsland 2.066 1.34 Brisbane 1.715 0.75 Brisbane 1.528 0.69
Gippsland 4.175 2.52 Gold coast 1.986 1.00 Gippsland 1.697 1.05 Sidney 1.509 0.59
Sidney 4.102 4.23 Portsmouth 1.973 1.05 Portsmouth 1.666 0.87 Three val. 1.432 0.44
WLB 4.097 1.88 Coliban 1.947 2.03 Sidney 1.588 0.65 Portsmouth 1.409 0.72
Yorkshire 4.045 5.12 South east 1.875 0.98 South east 1.573 0.68 South east 1.408 0.58
United Util. 3.993 4.04 Porto 1.742 1.09 Three val. 1.498 0.49 United Util. 1.368 0.48
Portsmouth 3.886 1.71 United Util. 1.737 0.76 United Util. 1.483 0.64 Yorkshire 1.342 0.44
Severn Trent 3.730 3.89 Sidney 1.719 0.68 Oeiras 1.461 0.68 South staffs 1.327 0.39
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5 First stage analysis
5.1 Bootstrap method
The deterministic nature of DEA creates several problems. Above, we dealt with the
aspect of influential observations, while this section tackles the problem of uncertainty
(and thus noise) in the data. Tackling this uncertainty follows a recent branch in the
non-parametric literature and allows us to estimate standard deviations, confidence
intervals and significance levels. Although the applied researcher can only estimate
the observed production frontier by the use of DEA, the literature interprets the esti-
mates as the true frontier. Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000) make a clear distinction
between the true (e.g., θ(x, y)) and the estimated concepts (e.g., θˆ (x, y)). The DEA
efficiency estimates are prone to uncertainty due to sampling variation. By the use of
a bootstrap methodology, Simar and Wilson allow to carry out traditional statistical
inference in DEA.
The bootstrap procedure, as invented by Efron (1979), is useful if the sampling prop-
erties of estimators are difficult to obtain analytically. The bootstrap approximates the
sampling distribution by reproducing the data generating process (DGP). This is the
statistical model which describes the process that yields the observed data in the sam-
ple. The DGP follows the principle that, restricted to the relations between inputs and
outputs, the stochastic elements in the productive process are totally encompassed
by the random inputs efficiency measures (hence, we do not assume measurement
errors). This makes the DEA estimators biased by construction as the estimate of the
production set ˆ is part of the real attainable set : ˆ ⊆ . Therefore, the estimated
efficiency score, θˆ (x, y), is an upward-biased estimator of the true efficiency score
θ(x, y) (for an extensive discussion, see Simar and Wilson 2008). The difference is
visualized in Fig. 1. The bootstrap (with B bootstrap replications) mimics this estima-
tion and creates a pseudo frontier from which it provides estimates of the sampling
distributions of the bias term θˆ (x, y) − θ(x, y). These bootstrap ideas are presented
in Figs. 2 and 3. For practical reasons, we invert the efficiency scores:
δˆ(x, y) = 1
θˆ (x, y)
. (5)
Indeed, as δˆ(x, y) ≥ 1 for all (x, y) ∈ , we only have to deal with one boundary
condition for δˆ, not two as in the case of θˆ . Although the literature describes several
approaches to simulate a bootstrap sample χ∗n (from the original sample χn), only
the homogeneous smoothed bootstrap is here introduced. This approach assumes the
distribution of the efficiency scores to be homogeneous over the input-output space
(compare with a homoskedasticity assumption in linear regression models), which
allows us to base the bootstrap on the sample estimates δˆi (xi , yi ). The eight steps of
the bootstrap algorithm are presented in Simar and Wilson (2008).
Having defined the bootstrap efficiencies, a bias-corrected estimator of δ(x, y) can
be constructed. Therefore, in a first phase, the bootstrap bias of δˆ(x, y) is estimated:
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Fig. 1 The true and the DEA frontier
Fig. 2 Bootstrap idea
Fig. 3 Bootstrap idea (2)
B̂ I ASB(δˆ(x, y)) = B−1
B∑
b=1
δˆ∗(x, y) − δˆ(x, y). (6)
The first term on the right hand side corresponds to the average of the bootstrap effi-
ciency result and the second term to the original DEA estimate. In a second phase, the
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The Netherlands 1.2158 1.3956 −0.1797 0.0092 1.2343 1.5692 1.3307 0.2171
England and Wales 1.3583 1.5502 −0.1919 0.0117 1.3792 1.7475 1.4124 0.3991
Australia 1.4528 1.6653 −0.2125 0.0120 1.4758 1.8575 1.4801 0.4737
Portugal 1.7540 1.9093 −0.1553 0.0072 1.7776 2.0710 1.7776 0.4558
Belgium 1.5998 1.8026 −0.2028 0.0111 1.6245 1.9940 2.2693 0.5576
Portugal-public 1.7607 1.9081 −0.1474 0.0062 1.7843 2.0584 1.7450 0.5212
Portugal-private 1.7415 1.9117 −0.1702 0.0089 1.7651 2.0946 1.8836 0.3146
All countries 1.5628 1.7438 −0.1809 0.0096 1.5856 1.9230 1.5243 0.4841
bias-corrected estimator is computed as
ˆˆ





Confidence intervals are obtained by means of the percentile method.
5.2 First stage results
Having cleared the data set from outlying observations, we proceed to the first stage
analysis where the input-oriented DEA-VRS model is applied. Average results per
country are presented in Table 10 (detailed results are available upon request). The
average efficiency amounts to 1.56. This indicates that an average DMU could decrease
its inputs by 35.9% (i.e., 1–1/1.56) while keeping its outputs constant, if it performed
as efficiently as its benchmark(s). A benchmark or best practice is a company which
performs technically efficient and hence makes part of the DEA frontier. Out of the 107
observations, there are 17 efficient DMUs (15.8%). These companies originate from
Belgium (5), England and Wales (4), Australia (4), the Netherlands (2) and Portugal
(2). A DMU with an efficiency score higher than 1 is relatively inefficient with respect
to its benchmarks.
Recognizing the presence of uncertainty in the data, we account for noise in the
data by estimating DEA corrected efficiencies with their 95%-confidence intervals
(cfr. Simar and Wilson 2008 and Alexander et al. 2007). The uncertainty resembles
the missing data, the imperfect quality of the data (even after auditing by regulators)
and the atypical results. By a homogeneous bootstrap, we generate 2000 bootstrap
samples (the estimated bandwidth yields h = 0.2469 and B = 2000). The average
bias-corrected estimates are displayed in Table 10. We clearly notice the upward-
bias in the original estimates (i.e., the unconditional estimates are more efficient). In
addition, we present the bootstrap estimates of 95%-confidence intervals for which
the average width amounts to 0.337. There is only little difference in the confidence
interval bandwidth among the five countries.
Due to the upward-bias in the original estimates and due to the bootstrap correction
in the confidence intervals, the original uncorrected estimates lie for every observation
outside, but close to, the lower-bound of the confidence interval. However, the bias-
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corrected estimates lie for every observation inside the confidence intervals. In general,
it is important to note that due to the overlap among the confidence intervals, mak-
ing a relative comparison among the firms is an intricate issue. In addition, as the
original DEA-estimates are biased, they cannot be interpreted as a ranking device.
Notice that we do not observe confidence intervals with a lower bound of 100% or
below. Indeed, as the true efficiency of a DMU cannot exceed 100%, and we measure
the 95%-confidence intervals, this is a correct observation.
In determining the efficiency of an industry as a whole, the average efficiency of
all DMUs can have a reduced meaning. Farrell (1957) points out that the industry
average should be computed as a weighted average based on the outputs (or on the
inputs). However, when several outputs (inputs) exist, Farrell does not refer how they
are weighted and if we should use the observed outputs (inputs) or the target outputs
(inputs). Here, we opt to weight the efficiency scores by the number of connections as
this is a measure for the number of people who are affected by the relative (in)efficiency
of a company. The average weighted efficiency scores are presented in the last column
of Table 10 and reveal that the Dutch water utilities are performing most efficiently
in a weighted as well as in an unweighted scheme. They are closely followed by the
privatized English and Welsh firms. The Portuguese and especially the Belgian firms
lag behind. The next section develops a second stage analysis which tries to explain
the efficiency scores by the use of environmental variables.
6 Second stage analysis
The efficiency of drinking water utilities is prone to environmental factors which are
not under control of the firms’ managers. Nevertheless, insight in these factors is
important for evaluating the cost of regulation. If, in an input-oriented model, an envi-
ronmental variable z is unfavorable on efficiency, the variable can be considered as
an additional and undesired output variable. The ‘production’ of this undesired output
decreases the efficiency as it absorbs inputs. A favorable environmental variable can
be considered as a substitutive input which could save the use of other inputs in the
production process. Section 6.1 addresses the use of bootstrapping in a second stage
analysis. Section 6.2 applies these theories to the drinking water utilities. In Sect. 6.3,
the efficiency scores are corrected by taking into account the environmental variables.
6.1 Theoretical framework
To explain the efficiency of DMUs, researchers have frequently employed a censored
or truncated (Tobit) regression model on the DEA-efficiency scores (recent examples
include Chavas et al. 2005 and Coelli et al. 2002):
δˆi = ziβ + i (8)
where zi is a (row) vector of firm-specific variables which is expected to influence the
efficiency of DMUi . β denotes a vector of parameters to be estimated together with
some statistical noise i .
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≥ 1, they argue that this involves a truncated rather than a
censored error term. Both censoring and truncation involve a loss of information
about the dependent variable, but where censoring assumes the observation of all
right-hand side variables, truncation supposes an information loss on both sides (left
and right-hand side) of the regression. Therefore, β and σ should be estimated by
the use of maximum likelihood. Nevertheless, the standard inference is intricate due
to three problems. First, in small samples, δˆi is highly influenced by the position of
the estimated frontier. As in linear regression models, this causes correlation among
the estimates (δˆi ). Secondly, also in small samples, as the input and output variables
which determine the DEA-efficiency are correlated with the environmental variables,
the error term i will be correlated with zi . These first two issues disappear asymp-
totically. A third and more serious problem is, as mentioned above, the bias of the
DEA-efficiency score δˆi towards 1. Simar and Wilson (2007) recommend a double-
bootstrap procedure to produce, with bias-corrected estimates of δˆi , valid confidence
interval estimates for the parameters in the second-stage regression.
However, as in the conventional Tobit regression, the environmental variables zi
in the double-bootstrap procedure do not influence the boundary of . This is due to
a separability condition: by assumption, the variables of Z lie in a space apart from
the production space for inputs and outputs . A second drawback of the described
double-bootstrap procedure is the reliance on some parametric assumptions such as a
linear model and a truncated normal error term. In Sect. 6.3, we discuss and implement
procedures which avoid these assumptions.
6.2 Second stage results
Although many elements in the physical, social as well as the institutional environ-
ment highly influence the cost level of the drinking water utilities, they lie outside the
control of the firms’ managers. However, due to the lack of (uniform) data, we make
some simplifications on the exogenous variables. In particular, we follow the variables
which have been frequently used in the literature (see Table 2). Nevertheless, also data
limitations and the particular question under research, which intends to identify the
incentives in local public utilities related to the regulatory and institutional issues,
shape the set of exogenous variables.
A first physical variable included in the second stage model is the percentage of
leakage. The variable captures the geographical relief (i.e., a more hilly landscape
requires more pressure on the network of pipes which could cause more easily leak-
age) and the extent of maintenance (i.e., more leakages correspond to less expenses
with maintenance). If the influence of the geographical circumstances outweighs the
neglect of maintenance, we expect a negative influence on efficiency. In the oppo-
site case, we anticipate a positive effect on efficiency. A second physical factor is
the percentage of groundwater extraction. Utilities abstracting more groundwater are
supposed to be more efficient, since the production cost is much lower than in utilities
that abstract superficial water or import water from other utilities. The proportion of
water delivered to industrial customers relative to domestic users is the third, and last,
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physical variable. It is expected that efficiency will change positively with a higher per-
centage of industrial customers. The first social environmental variable, gross regional
product (GRP), captures the relative wealth of the customers, the difference in skill
distribution (see above) and approximates the average productivity of a region. GRP
is measured in per capita purchasing power parity. Water consumption per capita, the
second and last social environmental factor, measures demand side management. We
incorporate five institutional dummy variables in the second stage analysis. The first
captures the scope of activities: we assign a dummy variable if the utility’s only activ-
ity is providing drinking water. Evidence from the literature suggests that drinking
water services have economies of scope and therefore they are more efficient when
they are responsible also for other activities as a result of the savings obtained with
the existing synergies. Corporatization, as a second institutional factor, is supposed to
have a positive effect on efficiency thanks to harder budget constraints. Corporatiza-
tion is the application by public entities of rules and mechanisms of the private sector,
which enable the public entities to practise a private management. The third institu-
tional variable denotes the water delivery in one (or maximum three) municipalities.
This indication of scale economies is expected to have a negative effect on efficiency
(i.e., in accordance to the literature we expect to find diseconomies of scale; De Witte
and Dijkgraaf 2007). Finally, we include dummy variables for utilities which have a
regulator or use a kind of benchmarking. We did not assign Portugal with a dummy for
benchmarking as it introduced its benchmarking only in 2005. We expect that these
two variables have a positive effect on efficiency.
In this subsection, we first evaluate the importance of the environmental influences.
As Tobit regressions has been frequently used in the past, as an illustration, we will
constrast these estimates with the superior double bootstrap estimations. The results
are presented in Table 11. The bias-corrected efficiency estimates are those obtained
in the bootstrap analysis of Sect. 5.2. Note that, in order to avoid two boundaries,
the dependent variable (δˆ) is larger or equal to one, so that a positive sign denotes
a negative influence on the efficiency (i.e., a favorable environmental factor), while a
negative sign denotes a positive influence (i.e., an unfavorable environmental factor).
Although in 3 out of 11 estimates the bootstrapping algorithm discovers the oppo-
site sign of the Tobit regressions, in only 2 cases the Tobit estimates are not covered
by the 95%-confidence intervals of the bootstrapped variables (see Table 12). To get
an idea on how strongly the different estimates are related, we present the correlation
coefficients in Table 13. According to the Pearson measure, the different estimation
techniques are closely related. This contrasts with the Spearman’s rank correlation
which reveals a close correlation between the Tobit regressions, however, no signifi-
cant correlation between the Tobit and bootstrap estimates.
The second stage results in Table 11 indicate that firms which spend less resources
on maintenance, and hence have a higher percentage of leakage, wrongly appear as
more efficient. The negative but insignificant results on groundwater use subvert the
postulate that the use of (cheaper) groundwater increases the efficiency. It is high-
lighted that the groundwater abstraction in some countries is often associated with the
size of utilities. For example, in Portugal only the small companies have the abstracted
water as source. Yet, more likely than providing an indication for economies of scale
(as we capture this effect later on), the estimation on groundwater use could indicate
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Intercept 3.1285∗∗∗ 2.0693∗∗∗ 2.7042∗∗∗ 3.1409∗∗∗ 4.2216∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leakage (%) −0.01580∗∗ −0.000895 −0.007403 −0.01101 −0.02258∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.934) (0.209) (0.245) (0.000)
Groundwater
extraction (%)
0.002825∗∗ 0.002178 0.002231∗ 0.003477∗ −0.0001359




−0.2313∗ 0.3487 −0.1026 −0.1772 0.02396∗∗∗




−4.16E−5∗∗∗ −1.52E−5 −2.15E−5∗ −3.74E−5∗ −6.879E−5∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.546) (0.092) (0.085) (0.000)
Consumption per
capita
4.56E−5∗∗ 5.55E−5∗∗ 5.08E−5∗∗ 6.08E−5∗∗ 5.716E−5∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.039) (0.015) (0.027) (0.000)
Water unique
activity (=1)
−0.2461∗∗ −0.1545 −0.2087∗ −0.3362∗ −0.2644∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.448) (0.065) (0.073) (0.000)
Corporatization (=1) −0.09583 −0.6898 −0.07701 −0.2759 1.2254∗∗∗
(0.703) (0.188) (0.735) (0.515) (0.000)
Delivery in one
municipality (=1)
−0.2973∗ −0.3443 −0.2943∗∗ −0.4677∗∗ −1.3448∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.183) (0.041) (0.049) (0.000)
Regulator (=1) 0.2620 0.6866 0.2056 0.4674 −0.9637∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.162) (0.274) (0.224) (0.000)
Benchmarking (=1) −0.7091∗∗∗ −0.7529∗∗ −0.6198∗∗∗ −0.9314∗∗∗ −0.1198∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.035) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000)
SE of regression 0.4424 0.4319 0.4643 0.4692 1.1498
Note: n = 107; p-values in brackets; *** Significance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%
that only the most efficient companies are capable to purify the more costly surface
water. Industrial customers do not encourage the utilities to produce most efficiently.
The social explanatory factor GRP reveals the expected positive influence on effi-
ciency. The negative influence on efficiency of consumption per capita indicates that
the policies of demand side management are filling up the wished. Hence, the com-
panies increase the efficiency by cost reductions rather than by increasing the water
sale. Concerning the first of the institutional variables, utilities with activities only in
drinking water provision show a positive signal. This evidence counters the literature
in that water services seem not to have economies of scope. The significant negative
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Intercept 4.2216∗∗∗ 1.9184 6.6944 In conf. inter.
Leakage (%) −0.02258∗∗∗ −0.06406 0.01550 In conf. inter.
Groundwater extraction (%) −0.0001359 −0.007760 0.007383 In conf. inter.
Industry water/household delivery 0.02396∗∗∗ 0.01353 0.03404 Not in conf. inter.
Gross regional product −6.879E−5∗∗∗ −1.579E−4 7.980E−6 In conf. inter.
Consumption per capita 5.716E−5∗∗∗ −6.598E−5 1.714E−4 In conf. inter.
Water unique activity (=1) −0.2644∗∗∗ −1.0319 0.4602 In conf. inter.
Corporatization (=1) 1.2254∗∗∗ −0.3341 2.6574 In conf. inter.
Delivery in one municipality (=1) −1.3448∗∗∗ −2.4574 −0.3601 Some in conf. inter.
Regulator (=1) −0.9637∗∗∗ −2.1884 0.1741 Not in conf. inter.
Benchmarking (=1) −0.1198∗∗∗ −1.3720 1.1548 In conf. inter.
∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1% level













DEA eff. censored 1.000 0.818** 1.000** 0.991** 0.391
DEA eff. truncated 0.912** 1.000 0.818** 0.882** 0.327
Bias-corr censored 0.999** 0.918** 1.000 0.991** 0.391
Bias-corr truncated 0.994** 0.946** 0.994** 1.000 0.382
DEA bootstrap 0.871** 0.668** 0.878** 0.835** 1.000
Note: n = 11; ** Significance at 1% level (two-tailed) and * significance at 5% level (two-tailed)
effect of corporatization by the bootstrap estimates could be linked with the fact that
corporatization makes the companies comprise all costs, leading them to seem wrongly
inefficient. The positive effect on efficiency of delivery in one municipality suggests
that the water utilities in the sample do not have scale economies, an observation in
line with the literature. The results of the regulator (existent or non-existent) reveal, in
correspondence with the literature, a positive effect of regulation on efficiency. Finally,
the effect of benchmarking on efficiency is positive and always with significance. This
tool to improve performance turns out to be very appropriate.
6.3 Taking into account environmental variables
The above mentioned separability assumption presumes that the environmental vari-
ables do not directly influence the efficiency scores, so that only ex post the influence of
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environmental variables on efficiency can be measured. To avoid this assumption, we
suitably adapt the conditional efficiency measures of Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007) to
the statistical inference framework of Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000). The integration
of these two frameworks has some attractive features as (1) avoiding the separabil-
ity condition, (2) creating a fully nonparametric model (i.e., it does not rely on any
a priori assumption on the functional form of the production set) and (3) allowing to
explore the influence of the environmental variables.
The conditional efficiency measure of Daraio and Simar (2005) introduces envi-
ronmental variables z in the efficiency scores of the evaluated DMU by conditioning
on the environmental variable zo. They propose to use a Kernel with compact support
(i.e., K (u) = 0 if |u| > 1) to smooth the variable z and to determine the appropri-
ate bandwidth by the use of the cross-validation principle. The procedure selects all
observations (x, y) in the neighborhood of zo:
χ DSn =
{
i | (xi,yi ) ∈ χn; |zo − zi |  h
}
. (9)
In a multidimensional framework, we first decorrelate the environmental variables by
the use of a Mahalanobis transformation (see, e.g., Mardia et al. 1979) and afterwards
perform a sequential (Epanechnikov) Kernel estimation.
The Daraio-Simar procedure is suitably adapted to the Simar-Wilson model by,
firstly, computing for each evaluated observation (xo, yo) the appropriate reference set
and, secondly, determining the noise corrected efficiency score by the bootstrap pro-
cedure, so that we obtain a conditional bias corrected efficiency estimate ˆˆδ(x, y | z).
As an exploratory tool to visualize the effect of the environmental variable, Daraio and
Simar (2005, 2007) suggest to nonparametrically regress the ratio ˆˆδ(x, y | z)/ ˆˆδ(x, y)
(i.e., the conditional bias corrected efficiency estimates to the unconditional estimates)
against zi . In the input-oriented model, a decreasing regression indicates a favorable
effect on efficiency of z (i.e., if not accounted for, the efficiency score will go up
with z), while an increasing regression specifies an unfavorable effect on efficiency
(i.e., behaving as a substitutive input). In a multivariate framework, we nonparamet-
rically regress the ratio of the fully conditioned variables to the partially conditioned
efficiency scores against the conditioned variable.
In this article, we are specially interested in the effects of incentive regulation to
the efficiency while taking into account the exogenous influences. In particular, by
employing the conditional efficiency measures, we control for those exogenous char-
acteristics which were significant in the DEA-VRS bootstrap method (i.e., z = leakage,
industry delivery, GRP, consumption per capita, economies of scope, economies of
scale, corporatization, regulation and benchmarking). Therefore, we can interpret the
conditional bias corrected efficiency scores as if the utilities are facing the same phys-
ical, social and institutional constraints and benefits. In comparison to the first stage
results, the conditional efficiency estimates, as presented in Table 14, reduce the effi-
ciency of the English and Welsh, the Dutch, the Australian and the private Portuguese
utilities (although, the estimated bias is similar). The companies obtained higher first
stage estimates thanks to favorable environmental influences. Next, we estimate the
conditional efficiencies without taking into account the effect of incentive regulation
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Table 14 Conditional bias corrected efficiencies















The Netherlands 1.820 −0.170 1.651 2.152 2.033 −0.175 1.859 2.402
England and Wales 2.120 −0.214 1.906 2.448 2.148 −0.218 1.930 2.456
Australia 1.613 −0.161 1.452 1.847 1.732 −0.160 1.572 1.969
Portugal 1.696 −0.147 1.549 1.913 1.702 −0.152 1.552 1.912
Belgium 1.838 −0.258 1.580 2.148 1.831 −0.251 1.581 2.129
Portugal-public 1.724 −0.142 1.581 1.932 1.721 −0.146 1.584 1.933
Portugal-private 1.645 −0.156 1.489 1.875 1.665 −0.165 1.493 1.873








       Absence of incentive
               regulation
   Incentive regulation
Fig. 4 Impact of incentive regulation
(i.e., the benchmarking and regulation dummy). As efficiency is reduced in all coun-
tries, we expect to find a favorable influence from incentive schemes on efficiency.
This is tested by the exploratory graph in Fig. 4 where the ratio of the fully conditioned
estimates (i.e., the full set of exogenous characteristics including incentive regulation)
to the partially conditioned estimates (i.e., without incentive regulation) is regressed
against the presence of incentive regulation. The negative monotonic first order effect
indicates that incentive regulation is favorable on efficiency, thus, utilities which are
facing incentive regulation, in the sense of benchmarking or regulation, are producing
more efficiently.
Together with the second stage results of Sect. 6.2, this analysis provides significant
evidence for the positive effects of incentive schemes on efficiency. The analysis even
demonstrates that in absence of clear and structural incentives the average efficiency
of the utilities falls in comparison with utilities which are encouraged by incentive
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regulation. The natural monopoly in the drinking water sector leads to the quiet life of
Hicks (1935) and X-inefficiency of Leibenstein (1966). The presence of benchmarking
(in the sense of sunshine regulation or yardstick competition) is a key element which
replaces competition in the market or competition for the market by competition by
comparison.
7 Conclusion
This paper has explored the effect of incentive schemes in the drinking water sector.
Different ideological views on the extent of state intervention in the economy create
various incentive structures. We have compared the incentive schemes implemented
in the Netherlands, England and Wales, Australia, Portugal and Belgium. Our results
show large differences in bias and noise corrected first stage inefficiencies. On average,
the benchmarked Dutch drinking water companies are performing better (average effi-
ciency score of 1.40) than the privatized English and Welsh utilities (1.55). However,
the strict regulatory model of Australia (1.66), the municipal provision in Belgium
(1.80) and especially the Portuguese municipal provision with private sector partici-
pation (1.90) are lagging behind.
We have interpreted the average ‘national’ efficiency score of a country as a mea-
sure for the homogeneity in efficiency of a country’s drinking water sector. Since the
number of utilities in the different national samples differ, by resampling we equalized
the sizes of the data sets. It turns out that the efficiency of the Belgian and Dutch drink-
ing water sectors are the most homogeneous. In those two countries, policy makers
should relatively easily find agreement among the utilities to adopt new laws.
The second stage procedures examine to which extent the inefficiencies could be
attributed to (un)favorable physical, social and institutional environmental factors.
Therefore, we have employed censored and truncated Tobit models and compared
these to the superior double-bootstrap procedure. The results detect the negative effect
on efficiency of the proportion of industrial customers and groundwater extraction, the
consumption per capita and the effect of a corporate structure. The portion of leakage,
the gross regional product, only supplying drinking water, the delivery in only one
municipality and the regulatory and benchmark incentive schemes yield a positive
effect on efficiency.
Finally, we have incorporated the physical, social and institutional environmental
factors in the efficiency scores by suitably adapting the conditional efficiency mea-
sures of Daraio and Simar (2005) to the bias correction model of Simar and Wilson
(1998, 2000). The conditional bias corrected efficiency estimates reflect efficiencies
as would the utilities work in exactly the same environment. With the exogenous
influences equalized, the variation left between the DMUs can mainly be attributed to
managerial influences. We noticed that the Dutch, English and Welsh, Australian and
private Portuguese utilities are working in a favorable environment. In addition, our
results provide significant evidence for the positive effects of incentive schemes on
efficiency. The analysis demonstrates that in absence of clear and structural incentives
the average efficiency of the utilities even falls in comparison with utilities which are
encouraged by incentives. The presence of benchmarking (in the sense of sunshine
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regulation or yardstick competition) is a key element which replaces competition in
the market or competition for the market by competition by comparison.
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